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PROGRESS AND THE EMPIRICAL
TRADITION IN CONDORCET
In a seminal text delivered before the Academie fran~ise on 21
February 1782 upon his admission to the company of the immortals,
Condorcet set out his faith in the mission of the Enlightenment. He
characterised his century as the age in which
le systeme general des principes de nos connaissances a ~t~
developp~; ou la methode de decouvrir la verite a ~te reduite en art,
et, pour ainsi dire, en formules; ob la raison a enfin reconnu la route
qu'elle doit suivre, et saisi le fil qui l'emp~chera de s'egarer (I, 390)1
The vision that he unveiled in his Discours de reception with such heady
optimism was one in which the human race would no longer accept the
inevitablity of the triumph of darkness over light, and in which the torch
of genius and reason was from now on inextinguishable. A determined
and tenacious confidence in the cumulative dynamics of progress is the
familiar hall-mark of Condorcet's world-view:
La verite a vaincu; le genre humain est sauve! Chaque siede
ajoutera de nouvelles lumieres 11 celles du siede qui l'aura precede; el
ces progres, que rien desormais ne peut arr~terni suspendre, n'auront
d'autres bornes que celles de la duree de l'univers (I, 390-91).
The rhetorical flourish of a public speech often heraIds a
crushing banality of content, then as now, but this was not to be the case
on this occasion, and any academician anticipating superficiality was to be
1 Referenccs to Condorcet's works are 10 the second, enlarged edition edited by A
Condorcet-O'Connor and F. Arago, Oeuvres completes de Condorcet (Paris, 1847-49).
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pleasantly surprised. Condorcet's confidence in man's future well-being
and prospcrily remained unshaken even when he was awaiting the
guillotine some ten ycars later, as can be seen from the evidence of that
extraordinary last work, his crowning achievement, the Esquisse d'un
tableau historique des pr,oqres de ]'esprit humain. However, it was not
sanguine. Outside Europe, prior to the American Revolution, the rest of
thc world was still in darkness (VI, 237-38). Condorcet was not indif-
ferent to the wounds that sVlI bled, as his Academy speech made clear:
Ne m'accusez pas d'~lre insensible aux maux de I'humanit~;je sais que
ses blessures saignent encore, que partout le joug de I'ignorance p~se
encore sur elle; que partout ol1l'homme de bien jette ses yeux, le mal-
heur et le crime viennent contrister sa vue el briser sa coeur (I, 394).
Phl1osophescould still be revolted by the human spectacle (VI, 244), but
in the struggle betwcen error and truth, superstition and reason, light and
darkness, the outcome was ultimately assured:
L'ignorance el I'erreur respirent encore, Hest vrai: mais ces monstres,
les plus redoutables ennemis du bonheur de I'homme, trainent avec
eux le trait Inortel qui fes a frapp~s; elleurs cris meme, qui vous
effraient, ne font que prouver combien les coups qu'i1s ont re~us
~taient sOrs et terribles (I, 395).
Thc historical stages of that victory, in the course of which the
chains of intcllcctual and political oppression were to be finally broken,
wcre set out in graphic detail in the ninth epoque of the Esquisse where
Condorcet surveyed the implications of the giant leap forward to Enligh-
tenmcnt taking placc between the Cartesian revolution and that other
revolution that had culminated in the death of the ancien regime and the
establishment or thc First Republic. The progress of man's mind and that
of man's liberty wcrc always for Condorcet closely interlinked processes,
and one of the main purposes of the Esquisse was to show
par quc)s degrcs ce qui nous paraitrait aujourd'hui un espoir chim~·
rique doit successivement devenir possible, et m~me facHe; pourquoi,
malgre lcs succcs des pr~jug~s,et I'appui qu'ils re~oivent de la corrup-
tion des gouvcrnements ou des peuples, la v~rit~ seule doit obtenir un
triornphe durable; par quels liens la nature a indissolublement uni les
progrcs des lurnieres et ceux de la libert~. de la vertu, du respect
.pour les droiLS natureis dc I'homme (VI, 20).
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The dystopic prophecies of Rousseau were discarded by
Condorcet without compromise. The progress of the sciences and the
arts offered no reason to fear for man's happiness, virtue and freedom.
Condorcet confronted Rousseau's pessinlism frequently - as, for example,
in his commentary on Voltaire's Le Mondain in his notes for the Kehl
edition of the great man's works (IV, 233-37).2 That pessimism, itself
grounded in despair at the consequences, as Rousseau had perceived
them, of the scientific enterprise, was attacked by Condorcet with
evidence drawn from the benefits that had accrued over the centuries as
a consequence of the forces that Rousseau deplored most. The achi-
evements of science, and particularly contemporary, post-Cartesian
science, were for Condorcet real and beyond dispute. They were central
to his notion of progress and to his uncompromising acceptance of the
perfectibility of nlan's nature and of that better world that would be
brought about through the beneficence of scientific endeavour.
In his Discours de reception he affirmed this credo in the
following terms:
Toute decouverte dans les sciences est un bienfail pour l'humanite;
aucun systeme de verites n'est st~rile. Nous avons recueilli les fruits
des travaux de nos peres; gardons-nous de croire que ceux de nos
contemporains puissent rester inutiles, et jouissons d'avance du
bonheur qu'ils repandront un jour sur nos neveux, comme un pere voit
avec plaisir croilre et s'elever l'arbre, dont l'ombrage doit s'etendre
sur sa posterite. 11 me serait facHe de confirmer cette verite. Temoin
neessaire du progres des sciences, je vois chaque ann~e, chaque mois,
chaque jour, pour ainsi dire, marques egalement par une decouverte
nouvelle et par une invention utile. Ce spectacle, ~ la fois sublime et
consolant, est devenu l'habitude de ma vie et une partie de mon
bonheur (I, 391-92).
Much of what Condorcet bad to say about scientific progress
related specifically to the dramatic discoveries emanating from great
contemporary malhematical minds. In his notes for the Kehl Voltaire he
catalogued the achievements of Bradley in the field of celestial
mathematics, of d'AJcmbert who had advanced significantly the calculus
2 Condorcet edited the 70 volume Kehl edition of Voltaire's works (Paris, 1785-89) in
collaboration with P.-A Caron de Beaumarchais, L-P. Decroix and Letellier.
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of fluid mechanics, and who had also solved the problem of equinoetial
precession inherited from Newton, of Bouguer who had elaborated the
laws relating to the gradation of light waves, of Euler whose work had
facilitated the discovery of acromatic lenses, of Rochon, Linnaeus,
FrankIin, RoueHe, Aubenton, Bernoulli, La Orange and others.
Condorcet's view of science was in essence Baconian: the foeus
of its activity was man; its purpose was man's happiness and welfare; its
operative prineiple the empirical path of rational enquiry based on the
observation of nature; its vision of the scientific endeavour a universalist
one. In another speech to the Academie fran~ise, in response to one
given by the comte de Choiseul-Oouffier, on 26 February 1784, he
reflected in distioctly Baconian terms on the interconnections and inter-
dependence of the sciences (I, 439). His debt to Bacon was further
acknowledged at great length in the Fragment sur l'Atlantide, ou efforts
combines dc l'esjJcce humaine pour le proqres des sciences towards the
end of the Esquisse (VI, 598-599). Later in the same year, on 4 Sept-
ember, this time speaking to the Academie des sciences, Condorcetagain
singled out Bacon's achievement in having taken the first hesitant steps
towards a nlethodology of truth (VI, 186).
Together with Galileo and Descartes, Bacon formed part of that
trio of colossi bestriding the old and the modern worlds to which Cond-
oreet payed tribute in the eighth epoque of the Esquisse. Descartes
deserved honlage, 'nlalgre ses erreurs', for having encouraged thinkers to
throw off the yokc of authority, but it was Bacon who had first unveiled
the 'true mcthod' or sLudying nature and penetrating its secrets: 'l'obser-
vation, I'expericncc ct lc calcul' (VI, 168). The power of Baeonian
science and its Nc\vtonian legaq as the driving force behind the astoo-
ishing progress made sincethe sixteenth century in physics, chemistry,
biolo!,'Y, astronomy, bolany. medicine and other 'hard' sciences were weIl
understood by OJndorcct, and it was an understanding that was sharcd
by many of his predeccssors and contemporarics. Condorcet's distinctive
eontribution to nlid and late-eighteenth-century applications of thc
English empiricallcgacy was his insight into the implications for thc moral
sciences, or what hc called in the -Tableau general de la seience, qui a
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pour objet l'application du calcul aux sciences politiques el morales,
'ma'lhematique sociale (I, 540).3
The point was underlined in his Discours de reception. Moral,
social and political areas of enquiry could advance only by being
harnassed to the observation of facts, and their mathematical analysis:
En meditant sur la nature des sciences morales, on ne peut, en effet,
s'empecher de voir qu'appuyees comme les sciences physiques sur
I'observation des faits, elles doivent suivre la m~me methode, acqu~rir
une langue egalemcnl exacte el precise, atteindre au m~me degr~ de
cerlilude (I, 392).
In the moral and political extensions of an empirically based methodology
lay the only authentie meehanism ofprogress, although Condorcetalways
conceded that the paee of that progress might be slow and tentative.
The marriage of science, and particularly mathematics, to the
analysis of social phenonlena led in Condorcet's thought to a consid-
eration of a universal thcory of knowledge and a universallanguage, and
he speculated at length on these issues in the tenth epoque of the
Esquisse (VI, 270-72). Universallanguage, appropriately formulated, was
to be the main tool of thc new methodology for understanding the world,
for rationally ordering our responses to its ever increasing complexities,
and for ultimately guaranteeing the onward march of progress.
~Iais, comme a mcsure que les faits se multiplient, I'homme apprend
ales classer, ales reduire II des faits plus generaux; comme les
instruJnents el les melhodes qui selVent llies obselVer, II les mesurer
avec exactitude, acquierent en meme temps une precision nouvelle;'
comme a mcsure que I'on connatt, entre un plus grand nombre
d'objcts, des ra pports plus multiplies, on parvient II les reduire ades
rapports plus elendus, et les renfermer sous des expressions plus
simples, ales prcscnter sous des formes qui permettent d'en saisir un
plus grand nombrc ... Ics verites ... sont bientÖt apres developpees
et prouvces par des met.hodes qui ne sont plus au-dessus d'une
inlclligence COffiJnUne (VI, 252-53).
3 PublishcJ after Condorcct's death in the Journal d']nslruclion sociaJe (22 June and 6
July 1795).
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The mission of scicnce was being given a s'ignificantly new,
humanised orientation in Condorcet's hands, and this expressed itself as
a central article of faith in his DiscoUTS de reception. Progress in the
physical sciences provi<.lcd an unstoppable momentum to progress in thc
moral scienccs, and nlininlised the risk of a relapse of modern society into
the barbarity of thc past. The union of the physical and the moral
sciences would give to thc latter an extended, and above a11 useful, field
of enquiry that would have practical impact on individuals' Jives, on the
institutions that governed Ulose Jives and on human nature itself. The
new 'social mathcnlatics' would forge a dynamic relationship between the
world of enlightcned nlinds and the world of ordinary men and wornen.
Condorcet's Enlightenment addressed the problems of setting in
place ways of transforilling tlle future as we11 as ways of solving shorter-
term problclllS by reforlning the present and alleviating the burdens of
the past.
Lc projet de rcndrc lous tcs hommes vertueux est chim~rique;mais,
pourquoi ne vcrrail-on pas un jour les lumi~res, jointes au g~nie, cr~er
pour des generalions plus heureuses une m~thoded'~ducation,un sys-
teme des lois qui rendraicnt presque inutile Je courage de Ja vertu 1
... Voycl, mainlcnant, d·un bout de l'Europe ~ I'autre, les hommes
cclaircs rcunir lous kurs cfforts pour le bien de I'humanit~,et tourner
vcr~ ccl obj~l seul laules leurs forces avec un courage et un concert
donl aucun siede n'a donn~ J'exemple (I, 395, 397).
If Bacon had pro\'idcd the model for enquiry and the first
hesitant insights into the inlcr-rclationships between the physical and the
moral sciences, thc Slruclurc of Condorcet's EnJightenment was firmly
anchorcd, not so much to English science (although his admiration for
Newton, for cxanlplc, \\'as unqualified, and the Newtonian influence on
his thought is clcarly d iscc rnihle ),4 but to Bacon's successors in the field
of cpistcnH)logy, Locke anll Hume. The characteristic feature of thc
progrcssivist cntcrprisc of thc Enlightenment, and the explanation for the
startling adva nccs tha t hall ta ken place in the modern age, lay for
Condorcct in the ahandonnlcilt of 'systems'. Condorcct's aborrence of
.. See my rorthcoming artick' in IlJl' f1ritish Journal forEighteenth-Century Sludies,
'Condorccl and lhe Ellgli~h Enlighll'nrrll'nl."
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metaphysical speculation constitutes a sustained leit-motifin his thinking,
whether on the subject of science, politics, economics, legislative codes,
canals, warnen, the abolition of the slave trade, or the rights of man.
Locke had cured Voltaire of 'la manie des systemes' (IV, 283); Franklin
had demonstrated the need to link the world of abstract knowledge to 'les
usages de la vie' (111, 417); Cartesianism, in so many ways for Condorcet
a brilliant beacon on the route to Enlightenment, had to be replaced by
'une philosophie plus vraie' if the century's vision ,of progress was to be
translated into transforrnative action.
It was to Locke that he turned in the quest for this 'truer
philosophy'. Locke had shown the English 'la route qu'il faut suivre en
metaphysique pour ne point s'egarer' (IV, 19). In the Esquisse
Condorcel elaborated on the qualities of Lockean procedures that
appealed to hirn. The precision of Locke's analysis of the origin of ideas
in sensation, with its associated concentration on the relationship between
ideas and words (what Locke called 'the great instruments of know-
ledge'), provided the key to the resolution of the problems posed by the
incoherence and indeterrninacy of the phenomena of human experience.
Locke had proved the link between inchoate perception and the operat-
ions of the nlind on sensation, and in so doing had provided the means
to guard against a danger that constantly haunted Condorcet, that of
'getting lost':
que la perception se borne aune partie seulement de chacune de ces
sensations composees. Il fait voir qu'en attachant un mot a chaque
idee, apres l'avoir analysee et circonscrite, nous parvenons anous les
rappeier constamment la meme, c'est a dire, toujours formee des
memes idees plus simples, toujours renfermees dans les memes '
limilCs, cl par consequent, a pouvoir l'employer dans une suite de
raisonnements, sans jamais risquer de nous egarer (VI, 182-83).
Lockc's emphasis on 'epistemological modesty' was fully shared
by CondorccL Reason was a powerful tool of enlightenment, but useless
\vhen applied to the unanswerable questions of Panglossian-style
1l1ctaphysics. In thc Eloge de m. Duclos the folly of Cartesianism had
bccn defined prcciscly as 'cette fureur de se croire oblige de rendre
raison, bien ou l11a1, dc tous les phenomenes' (11, 33). Above all, it was
Lockc's prcccpl, set out in the EssaJ/concerningHuman Understandinq,
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that 'our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern
our conduct',S that enabled Condorcet to define the real business of
phiJosophe science and the neeessarily delimited nature of its mission
without undermining his own optimism and faith in the possibility of
progress. Locke was the first to map out the frontiers of human
knowledge and to det~rmine the nature of the truths that it cauld
embrace. Locke had argued, moreover, that scientific and philosophical
enquiry should take on board the moral sciences. This was a dazzlingly
illuminating concept for C<?ndoreet:
c'est eo I'applicant llia morale, llla politique, lll'~cooomie publique,
qu'ils soot parvenus II suivre dans ces sciences une marche presque
aussi sOre que celle des sciences naturelles; II o'y plus admettre que
des veril~s prouvees, II stparer ces verites de tout ce qui peut rester
encore de douleux et d'incertaio; II savoir ignorer enfio ce qu'iI est
eocore, ce qu'iI sera toujours impossible de connaitre (VI, 183).
Locke's method provided for Condoreet the 'universal
instrument' to be applied to the discovery of truth across the whale range
of human expericnce and enquiry, and the influenee of Lockean
epistemological procedures on Condorcet is incontrovertible, although it
has to be said that while we know that Condoreet could read English
texts in the original, our knowledge of what Condorcet actually did read
of Locke's works is still a mattcr for speculation and informed
assumption. What can be said is that his writings evoke Lockean
precepts and formulations in ways thatsuggest an easy familiarity with the
Essay concerninq Human Understanding. In the light of that text, any
appreciation of thc impact on Condorcet of Lockean views on language
as an instrument of analysis, on sensationalist theory, and above all on
probability, must take us back anee more to Condorcet's nates to his
reception speech to the Academy. It was in the Discours de receplion
that he paid his most public tribute to Locke's role in establishing thc
mcthodological foundations of the moral and political sciences wilhin
fresh paranlctcrs of scnsationalist psychology.
5 John Locke, .t1n Essay on !luman Understanding, cdited by A C. Frascr (Oxford,
1894): I, 31.
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He took up the key epistemological themes of the Discours in
the Esquisse where he mapped out the path ahead for the Enlighten-
ment, and finally drew out in some detail the implications for society of
the new insights to be derived from the Lockean relationship between
method and language, certainty and probability, mathematisation/classifi-
cation and 'philosophical calculus'. It is here that the potential power of
Condorcet's later application of Lockean epistemology to the social
sciences and the imperatives of the moral universe is clearly spelled out:
Ainsi l'analyse de nos sentiments nous fait d~couvrir, dans le develop-
pement de notre faculte d'eprouver du plaisir et de la douleur, l'origi-
ne dc nos idees morales, le fondement des verites g~n~ralesqui, resul-
tant de ces idees, d~terminent les lois immuables, n~cessaires du juste
et de I'injuste; enfin, les motifs d'y conformer notre conduite, puises
dans la nature meme de notre sensibilite, dans ce qu'on pourrait
appeler, en quelque sorte, notre constitution morale (UI, 183-184).
References to Locke abound in Condorcet's writings, but in
addition to the Discours, there is one other text that deselVes a special
mention as evidence of Condorcet's understandingofLocke's significance,
and that is the obitual)' that he wrote for Condillac soon after the latter's
death on 2/3 August 1780. Most of the philosophes owed their know-
ledge of Lockean sensationalist psychology to Condillac's 1754 Traite des
sensations, which was widely taught in the colleges in the second half of
the eighteenth century. Condorcet's Notice historique et critique sur
Condillac appeared in the Journal de Paris on 25 September 1780,6 and
it offered readers a tribute to Condillac's achievements that was at best
luke-warm. However, one aspect of Condillac's work recommended itself
to Condorcet, and that was Condillac's adherence to procedures that
recalled Locke's 'plain, historical method' and the pioneering analytical
methodology that had been instrumental in cl)'stallising the link between
ideas and their origins in sensation. Reviewing Condillac's life-work,
therefore, Condorcet was reminded of how much Locke had achieved in
fulfilling thc promise of the original Baconian vision (Notice, p. 237).
6 Reference is to the text of this work edited by K. M. Baker, "Un eloge officieux de
Condorcet: sa nOlice historique et critique sur Condillac," Revue de synthese 3 (1967):
236-251.
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Finally, there remains the testimony of the Esquisse, his final and
perhaps most impressive declaration of faith in man's ability to progress.
Here he made clear his debt to Locke in the context of his doctrine of
moral sentiment. He opened his tableau with a portrait of primitive man
as the one creature possessing the faculty of receiving sensations, of
renecting upon them, of 'analysing and recombining them meaningfully.
The pleasure-pain principle engendered moral feelings and, eventually,
relationships based on enlightened self-interest. The sensations became
in this scenario the driving torce behind man's painful climb out of the
darkness of primitive pre-sociallife and his advance towards the light of
civilisation:
Ce progr~s est soumis a ux memes lois g~n~rales qui s'observent dans
le developpement des facult~s chez les individus, puisqu'il est le
resultat de ce developpement, consid~r~ en meme temps dans un
grand nombre d'individus r~unis en societ~ (VI, 12).
In the fifth epoque he paraphrased in a capitalised text that
seminal Lockean statement on innate ideas, tracing its source back to
Aristotle:
que nos idees meme les plus abstraites, les plus purement intellec-
tucHes, pour ainsi dire, doivent leur origine ~ nos sensations' (VI, 88).
If Aristotle had sown the seeds of the epistemological upheaval that
flowed from that precept however, Locke's achievement had been to
bring those sceds to a rcmarkable fruition:
Ce fut plutöt l'aper~u d'un homme de g~nie, que le resultat d'une
suite d'obscrvations analys~esavec pr~cision,et combin~esentre elles
pour en faire sortir une v~rit~ g~n~rale: aussi ce germe jet~ dans une
tcrre ingrale, ne produisit de fruits utiles qu'apr~splus de vingt si~c1es.
Locke had cnabled the human race to finally part company with
the errors of ilS infancy, and in so doing his 'truer philosophy' had
accel~ratcd significantly the momentum of human progress (VI, 1-3).
To set Condorcct's view of progress and enlightenmcnt within an
English empirieal, and cssentially Lockean, tradition is not to dcny thc
existence of other po\vcrul, formative influences. Recent scholarship has
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rightly drawn attention to the importance of Hume's thought, for
example,7 and certainly Condorcet's application of probability reasoning
suggests an interesting linkage with the Treatise on Human Nature
(especially the third chapter, 'Of Knowledge and Probability'). Berkeley
and Adam Smith also need to be further investigated as sources of that
unique blend of empiricism and intuitivism so characteristic of
Condorcet's notion of 'mathematique sociale'.
Yet the authority of Locke's name remains a central point of
reference in Condorcet's thought across a broad spectrum of contexts.
It was through the application of Lockean insight that Newtonian science
had been brought down to earth,8 that Cartesian methodic doubt had
been transplanted from the domain of mythical systems to the social
arena of profane humanity, that the transcendental terms of the Pascalian
wager had been rejected.9 The challenge of man's salvation would from
now on be irreversibly secularised, a process that was consolidated with
the birth after 1789 of what we can now recognise as our own world.
Condorcet helped to usher in that new, and in some ways much more
complex world with a 'social mathematic' of revolutional)' importance,
and one which, in accordance with the whole spirit of his brand of
Enlightenment, encapsulated a crucial Lockean concern: 'Elle ales
hommes pour objet... ' (I, 543).
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1 See K. M. Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics
(Chicago & London, 1975): 138-155.
8 See G.-G. Granger, La Mathematique du marquis de Condorcet (Paris, 1956): 38.
9 Condorcet published an edition of Pascal's Pensees in 1776. It was reprinted as the
Eloge et Pensees de Pascal (Paris, 1778).
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